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Summary and Keywords
Economic nationalism tended to dominate U.S. foreign trade policy throughout the long 
19th century, from the end of the American Revolution to the beginning of World War I, 
owing to a pervasive American sense of economic and geopolitical insecurity and 
American fear of hostile powers, especially the British but also the French and Spanish 
and even the Barbary States. Following the U.S. Civil War, leading U.S. protectionist 
politicians sought to curtail European trade policies and to create a U.S.-dominated 
customs union in the Western Hemisphere. American proponents of trade liberalization 
increasingly found themselves outnumbered in the halls of Congress, as the “American 
System” of economic nationalism grew in popularity alongside the perceived need for 
foreign markets. Protectionist advocates in the United States viewed the American 
System as a panacea that not only promised to provide the federal government with 
revenue but also to artificially insulate American infant industries from undue foreign-
market competition through high protective tariffs and subsidies, and to retaliate against 
real and perceived threats to U.S. trade.
Throughout this period, the United States itself underwent a great struggle over foreign 
trade policy. By the late 19th century, the era’s boom-and-bust global economic system 
led to a growing perception that the United States needed more access to foreign 
markets as an outlet for the country’s surplus goods and capital. But whether the United 
States would obtain foreign market access through free trade or through protectionism 
led to a great debate over the proper course of U.S. foreign trade policy. By the time that 
the United States acquired a colonial empire from the Spanish in 1898, this same debate 
over U.S. foreign trade policy had effectively merged into debates over the course of U.S. 
imperial expansion. The country’s more expansionist-minded economic nationalists came 
out on top. The overwhelming 1896 victory of William McKinley—the Republican party’s 
“Napoleon of Protection”—marked the beginning of substantial expansion of U.S. foreign 
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trade through a mixture of protectionism and imperialism in the years leading up to 
World War I.
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nationalism, foreign markets
Trade, the Fiscal-Military State, and the 
American Revolution
The timing of the publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) amid the 
American Revolution was more than coincidental. Smith in fact spilled a great deal of ink 
within his now-famous tome offering solutions to the imperial problem, solutions that 
might avoid further intra-imperial conflict between the British Empire and its thirteen 
agitated North American colonies. Colonial trade policy was key to Smith’s proposed 
solutions, all the more so because, as he saw it, the conflict had largely arisen over the 
issues of trade and taxation. Smith’s observations foreshadow the key role that trade 
policy would play in the shaping of U.S. foreign relations from the American Revolution to 
World War I.
The Bank of England ended up linking the American Revolution circuitously with imperial 
trade policy. Upon its 1694 creation, the Bank of England provided a modern form of 
banking that allowed for massive loans and large government debts, which in turn 
facilitated the creation of a stronger centralized government and an expanded army and 
navy. The British Empire had acquired a fiscal-military state, a modernized political 
economic system that could fund a standing army and navy across the empire through a 
combination of public debt and large revenues. This development had long-term 
repercussions felt throughout the globe, including among the peripheral British colonies 
of North America. The other European imperial powers had little choice but to follow 
Britain’s fiscal-military suit. European governments increasingly had access to 
substantial lines of credit and revenue. Warfare, imperial expansion, and balance-of-
power politics all took on ever more global proportions as the European powers played a 
taxing game of “catch up” with their imperial rivals. Most spectacularly, the French and 
British fought the first “great war” from 1689 to 1815. However, these same mounting 
demands of the fiscal-military state began requiring massive injections of New World 
wealth into the European economy.
The British colonies thus became critical for financing British wars, which occasionally 
played out on the sidelines of the New World. Skirmishes between the British and French 
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in 1754 in the Ohio Valley sparked a global conflict—the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763)—
that was felt on nearly every continent. The war spanned from French Canada, the Great 
Lakes, and the Caribbean, to Bengal, Manila, West Africa, and the coast of France. The 
war also sparked a fiscal-military crisis within the British Empire, with long-term 
consequences for U.S. foreign trade policy. The end result led to the American Revolution 
and over a century of strained Anglo-American trade relations.
Britain’s eventual military victory in the Seven Years’ War also had long-term 
repercussions for European power politics. In the New World, Britain gained the French 
North American territories. The very gains from the war’s settlement put more strain on 
British imperial finances. How would the empire pay for the defense of these large 
swathes of territory? Part of the answer lay in placing greater fiscal demands upon the 
British North American colonists to pay for their own defense. Such increases in colonial 
taxation without imperial representation, along with the growing market power of the 
thirteen colonies, in turn planted the seeds of dissent among Britain’s North American 
colonists. The growth of the British Empire’s fiscal-military need for revenue and liquidity 
therefore placed the marketplace of the peripheral thirteen colonies—and thus colonial 
trade policies—more and more into the center of British imperial debates.
Colonial consumer politics contributed to revolutionary demands. Mass consumption in 
the colonies helped create a unique colonial identity, a testament to colonists’ growing 
economic and political individualism. For example, British colonial consumption of tea 
had stymied any possible cultural and political divisions. But colonial non-importation of 
these goods throughout the 1760s and 1770s demonstrated growing willingness among 
colonists, the majority of whom yet hugged the Atlantic coast, to stand together against 
the expansive—and expensive—system espoused by the debt-ridden imperial center in 
London, which viewed the seemingly decadent, free-loading thirteen colonies as able to 
bear more of the exorbitant costs of the modern fiscal-military empire.
It was this very fiscal-military crisis in the colonies that Adam Smith sought to resolve in 
calling for a complete change in the trade relationship between the imperial metropole 
and its disgruntled North American colonies. But the military successes of the 
Revolutionary army made Smith’s proposed colonial trade reforms irrelevant. The end 
result was the creation of the United States. The subsequent Anglophobia and 
geopolitical tensions between the fledgling nation and its former motherland would lead 
to a series of Anglo-American trade wars in the next century and played a key role in 
shaping the development of U.S. foreign trade policy up to World War I.
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From Trade Wars to the War of 1812
The young country immediately found itself threatened on all sides. U.S. foreign trade 
policy reflected, and at times exacerbated, this geopolitical quandary. The United States 
was surrounded on all sides by hostile European empires, whether by land or by sea. The 
country’s access to previously lucrative shipping lines and international markets was cut 
off. Yet the American national government found itself unable to override the 
intractability of the states on issues concerning public debt, domestic and foreign 
taxation, and providing for national defense—all key elements for a functioning modern 
fiscal-military state—owing to the decentralizing tendencies inherent in the Articles of 
Confederation. In other words, the U.S. government was effectively helpless when it 
came to protecting the country’s foreign trade.
The Spanish Empire struck in 1784 in the American West, cutting off the Mississippi 
River to American shipping. John Jay, after much wrangling, was able to obtain potential, 
but not guaranteed, use of the Mississippi. This was not enough for some in the American 
South, dependent as that section was upon foreign exports. James Wilkinson of Kentucky, 
for instance, spent three months in 1787 with the Spanish governor of New Orleans, at 
the end of which Wilkinson pledged allegiance to Spain and suggested that he could 
deliver Kentucky to the Spanish Empire.
The episode hints at the problems facing both the future of U.S. foreign trade policy and 
the nation itself. In 1784, Massachusetts farmers found themselves unable to supply the 
fiscal demands being placed upon them, and they expressed their outrage with an armed 
uprising known as Shays’ Rebellion. James Madison, the man who would become known 
as “the Father of the Constitution,” came to believe the farmers were undertaking secret 
communications with the viceroy of Canada. All of this was occurring as Vermont 
considered union with Canada and as others in the West similarly flirted with the British 
in order to gain shipping and fishing access in the Great Lakes. As George Washington 
observed in 1784, “the western settlers … stand as it were upon a pivot; the touch of a 
feather would turn them any way.”
Even as American leadership looked helplessly on as the country found itself surrounded 
on all sides by hostile European powers, Barbary pirates began raiding American 
merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. Suddenly bereft of British naval protection, U.S. 
trade was cut off from the Mediterranean. Desperate American officials John Adams and 
John Jay unsuccessfully attempted to obtain naval assistance from the Spanish, French, 
and even the British. Jefferson—so often associated with the agrarian-based ideology of 
free trade called “Jeffersonianism”—was so upset by European refusals of protection that 
in 1786 he suggested that Congress should enact a special punitive tariff on European 
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commerce to make up the expense. The Barbary threat to American Mediterranean trade 
greatly affected commercial calls for constitutional reform. The diplomatic historian 
Thomas Bailey has gone so far as to suggest that “in an indirect sense, the brutal Dey of 
Algiers was a Founding Father of the Constitution.”
Lacking an adequate fiscal-military state, many of these foreign trade crises stemmed 
from the American national government’s inability to raise federal revenues, which were 
in large part gathered indirectly through import tariffs well into the 20th century. The 
federal government was in a bind, as it was unsure of how to pay off its foreign debt, 
which had grown quickly from 1783 to 1788. Nor did it know how it was going to pay for 
a sufficient army and navy to defend American territory and commercial interests.
Continued foreign trade restrictions exacerbated the demand for constitutional reform. 
Beginning in July 1783, British Orders in Council had shut off the British West Indies to 
American trade. By 1788, U.S. exports there declined by 46 percent. Further Orders in 
Council barred U.S. ships from carrying non-British goods into any port in the British 
Empire. American farmers who produced enough for foreign export suffered most from 
the loss of the British West Indies market. By 1786 the unequal balance of trade showed 
British exports to the United States nearly double American exports to Britain.
Farmers were not the only ones suffering from a decentralized U.S. foreign trade policy 
in the 1780s. Unlike U.S. agrarian desires for freer foreign trade, American 
protectionists, especially struggling “infant” industrialists in Pennsylvania and New 
England and their representatives in Congress, called for greater regulation of U.S. 
commercial policy. They thought that by erecting federal protective tariff barriers, 
America’s domestic “infant” industries would be able to mature. Under the Articles of 
Confederation, however, no uniform national tariff policy could be established, nor were 
the predominantly agrarian, export-oriented southern states in favor of such a policy. One 
British magazine happily reported in 1785 that “the restraint laid upon [American] trade 
with the British West India islands has thrown them into the utmost perplexity; and by 
way of retaliation they are passing laws inimical to their own interest; and what is still 
worse, inconsistent with each other … Hence the dissentions that universally prevail 
through what may be called the thirteen Dis-United States.”  These ongoing threats to 
American trade spurred federal leaders to centralize power by adopting the Constitution 
in 1789.
European encroachment upon U.S. freedom of trade would soon lead to another war with 
the British Empire. Republican leaders of the early republic increasingly viewed the 
ongoing Napoleonic War between Britain and France as a threat to the prestige and 
success of the tenuous republican government of the United States. By 1803 the ongoing 
Anglo-French conflict led to further curtailments of U.S. trade.
2
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French and British seizure of American ships and sailor impressments promised to 
undermine U.S. national and commercial sovereignty. President Thomas Jefferson sought 
a European embargo in December 1807. Foreshadowing the subsequent failure of 
Confederate “King Cotton” diplomacy of the Civil War, Jefferson badly overestimated the 
susceptibility of England to the American embargo. To make matters worse, the newest 
British Orders in Council and the French Berlin and Milan Decrees (1806–1807) put 
American “neutral” trade at further risk of seizure. Jefferson believed his embargo would 
put such economic pressure on the European belligerents that it would end the European 
seizures. But he was proven wrong.
Some southern Republicans were keen to note that cotton and tobacco profits had fallen 
owing to the British blockade of the Continent. Republicans in other areas foresaw 
economic depression and losses of tariff revenue. The historian Jon Latimer goes so far as 
to claim that “the basis of antagonism that led to war was America’s desire to continue its 
overseas trade undisturbed by events in Europe.”  At war’s end, however, Americans had 
gained none of their war aims. Their capital city lay in ruins. European impressment of 
American ships continued. U.S. foreign trade found itself hit hard again in 1815, when 
agrarians found their excess wheat was excluded from the British Isles owing to the 
passage there of the Corn Laws, which established restrictive protective tariffs on foreign 
grain. The War of 1812 had done little to ease the restrictions on U.S. foreign trade.
Westward Expansion and the Civil War, 1816–
1865
The largest transformations in U.S. foreign trade policy during the long 19th century 
most often occurred (1) as a consequence of war, (2) in the wake of economic crises, or 
(3) in those rare instances in which one party found itself in control over both houses of 
Congress and the executive branch. The years that followed the War of 1812 were no 
exception. The Tariff of 1816, for example, was meant to shelter U.S. infant industries 
from Britain’s more advanced industrial exports and was sold to the pro-free-trade 
Anglophobic South as a temporary preventative measure in case of another war with 
Britain. Then, in 1819, an economic panic struck. U.S. economic nationalists used the 
Panic of 1819 to gain the upper hand in federal politics, and thereafter passed a series of 
protectionist bills in 1824, 1828, 1832, and 1842, all of which were aimed at insulating 
“infant” Pennsylvania iron industries, hemp growers in Kentucky, and sugar growers in 
Louisiana, among others, from foreign competition. Owing in no small part to changes in 
British trade policy and to U.S. westward expansion, those supporting trade liberalization 
were able to turn the protectionist tide in 1846.
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U.S. trade liberalization from 1846 to 1860 arose largely as a result of the influence in 
the United States of Victorian free-trade ideology, to changes in British trade policy, and 
to Anglo-American geopolitical tensions. The transatlantic influence of Victorian free 
trade policies and ideas played a major role in shifting the United States toward freer 
trade between 1846 and 1860. At the same time as Jeffersonian free traders like 
President James K. Polk and his Treasury Secretary Robert Walker, the principal author 
of the low 1846 tariff bill, were seeking an aggressive policy of westward expansion, the 
British were abandoning protectionism for free trade owing to the lobbying efforts of the 
Anti-Corn Law League (ACLL, 1839–1846). Even as Richard Cobden, Victorian England’s 
“apostle of free trade” and leader of the ACLL, argued for overturning England’s 
longstanding protective duties on foreign grain, Polk was turning his imperial sights 
toward the Oregon Territory, an area to which both the United States and the British laid 
claim and one that promised to open up Pacific-Rim markets to U.S. exports. As this 
Anglo-American territorial dispute became more heated, American Anglophobia 
skyrocketed; demands for war with the British grew ever louder.
Anglo-American free traders sought to diffuse the territorial dispute amicably. Richard 
Cobden believed that free trade and foreign policy non-interventionism would make the 
world’s markets so interconnected that war would be made obsolete. His ideology 
became known as Cobdenism, and found transatlantic disciples among some of the most 
avid abolitionists in the United States: men like William Lloyd Garrison, Reverend Joshua 
Leavitt, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and New York Post editor William Cullen Bryant. For 
them, Anglo-American trade liberalization at once promised to end the Oregon dispute 
peacefully and to help the transatlantic antislavery cause. Bryant’s pro-free-trade New 
York Post argued in January 1846 that a “free trade tariff on both sides will settle the 
matter quickly and give us something better to do than fighting.” The ACLL gave its 
encouragement from across the Atlantic, even as the Corn Laws were on the verge of 
being overturned. For both sides of the debate, trade was linked to security: for Anglo-
American Cobdenite idealists, trade liberalization was linked to peace; for American 
protectionists, trade barriers were at once a defensive and offensive weapon for a world 
perpetually at war.
The coinciding of transatlantic trade liberalization with famine in Ireland held forth the 
possible expansion of free-grown wheat exports to Europe, while simultaneously 
undermining the European reliance upon slave-grown cotton. The Irish potato famine 
only added to the Cobdenite desire for Anglo-American trade liberalization. Overturning 
the Corn Laws promised several benefits: easy access to non-slave-grown U.S. western 
wheat; potentially providing Great Britain with cheap U.S. grain; strengthening the 
power of the antislavery states in Congress; and ameliorating Anglo-American tensions 
through strengthened trade ties. Anglo-American Cobdenites were proven partly right. 
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The year 1846 witnessed the passage of the low 1846 Walker Tariff, abolishing the 
English Corn Laws, a modest increase in U.S. wheat and corn exports to Ireland, and a 
peaceful end to the Oregon boundary dispute.
Less peacefully, the U.S. Navy’s Commodore Matthew Perry forced Japan, at cannon’s 
mouth, to open the island nation’s ports to U.S. trade in 1853. Japan had been closed to 
Western trade for more than two centuries. In 1854 Perry, representing the U.S. 
government, required that Japan sign a treaty allowing U.S. merchant ships access to 
select Japanese ports. Another treaty was signed in 1858 opening up even more Japanese 
ports to U.S. trade. Perry’s opening up of Japanese markets contributed to the collapse of 
the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1867 and the rise of the so-called Meiji Restoration in 1868.
Without the threat of cannon, the United States also set up a reciprocity agreement with 
the British colony of Canada in 1854. The reciprocal trade regime tended toward trade 
liberalization between the two contiguous states. But to the chagrin of Anglo-American 
free traders, little else along these lines developed in the years that followed.
The passage of the low tariff of 1857 turned out to be the last U.S. legislation in favor of 
trade liberalization for more than half a century. An economic panic coincided closely 
with the new legislation, and the protectionist majority of the recently formed Republican 
Party would make good political use of this timing. The Republicans won the 1860 
presidential election on a platform built around antislavery and economic nationalism. 
The passage of the Republican-backed protectionist Morrill Tariff and the arrival of 
Abraham Lincoln in the White House in March 1861 heralded an American era (1861–
1933) largely dominated by Republican presidencies and a trade policy of protectionism 
at home and abroad.
The North’s Morrill Tariff also exacerbated Anglo-American tensions during the first 
couple years of the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865). Following Britain’s shift to free trade 
after 1846, the ideology of Cobdenism effectively became the closest Britain came to a 
national identity. But while the British rallied to free trade, the Republican Party instead 
went fast to work toward establishing the American System of economic nationalism. 
Free-trade England found the North’s turn to protectionism outrageous and ill-timed. 
Many Britons viewed the protectionist legislation as a threat to British exports, 
antithetical to Britain’s Cobdenite ideals, and as a further source of alienation against the 
country’s seceding southern states. The Union compounded British outrage with the 
establishment of a blockade of southern ports, cutting off British access to southern 
cotton, which at that time made up nearly 80 percent of the island nation’s raw cotton 
imports.
The Confederacy sought to exploit the initial transatlantic confusion surrounding the 
war’s causation by practicing King Cotton diplomacy—the threat of withholding cotton 
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from a European market still dependent on the U.S. export—while simultaneously 
promising free trade in the hope of obtaining recognition from the cotton-dependent 
European powers. During the first year of the war, the Confederacy’s governmental and 
nongovernmental free-trade diplomacy proved to be quite effective in confounding 
European public opinion, in garnering a certain measure of sympathy, and thereby 
increasing the prospect of European recognition. By 1863, however, the transatlantic 
confusion surrounding the Morrill Tariff had largely been dispelled, although Anglo-
American misunderstandings stemming from the war’s fraught foreign trade diplomacy 
would continue to exacerbate transatlantic tensions and American Anglophobia in the 
decades leading up to World War I.
America’s Outward Thrust, 1865–1889
After the Civil War, a perception grew among more and more Americans that 
overproduction and surplus capital required foreign markets. A great debate arose, 
however, over whether the United States should access them peaceably or coercively; 
that is, whether the United States should practice free trade or protectionism as its 
preferred foreign trade policy. Geopolitical insecurity and domestic politics became 
entwined with U.S. foreign trade policy. Anglophobic Republicans sought a combination 
of protectionism and informal imperialism—the imperialism of economic nationalism—to 
counteract British free-trade imperialism in the Western Hemisphere, to stave off cheap 
exports from free-trade England in order to protect U.S. infant industries, and to 
maintain artificially high prices for goods and wages for workers. Those favoring free 
trade argued instead that trade liberalization would lessen Anglo-American tensions, 
peaceably increase U.S. exports, and make goods cheaper for all Americans. The 
importance of wages and prices in the fight over U.S. trade policy highlights as well the 
growth of American consumer demands for international products throughout this period. 
The onset of a series of economic depressions between 1873–1896 only polarized the 
debate, whereupon the Republican Party’s Anglophobic promise of high prices and high 
wages alongside coercive market expansion tended to win out over the free traders’ 
promise of cheap goods and peaceful foreign market expansion. The “tariff question” thus 
came to dominate postbellum U.S. political debates.
The 1865 victory of the Union brought an end to the southern system of slavery. In the 
years of Reconstruction that followed, with a wary eye toward free-trade England, the 
Republican Party (based largely in northern manufacturing regions) fast turned its 
attention from supporting African American civil rights to supporting protectionist trade 
policies. In 1883, Republicans oversaw the passage of the protectionist 1883 “Mongrel 
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Tariff,” so named because neither party wanted to take credit for the measure. By 1884, 
Republicans would ideologically and politically coalesce around the American System of 
economic nationalism, with long-term effects for U.S. foreign trade policy.
Republican economic nationalism sparked retaliation in Canada, and thus played a 
critical role in determining the course of North American economic integration. 
Republican protectionists, still stinging from perceived British diplomatic slights during 
the Civil War, were quick to abrogate the reciprocity treaty with Canada in 1865, as both 
states turned to economic and political nationalism. Canada had passed its first 
protective tariff in 1859 (the Galt Tariff), and it gained even greater sovereignty over its 
foreign trade policy when it confederated in 1867. In 1879, largely in response to 
continued Republican unwillingness to liberalize trade between the contiguous states, 
Canadian Conservatives consolidated around an economic nationalist platform that was 
openly hostile toward its southern neighbor. It also included a desire for stronger 
economic ties with the rest of the British world of white settler colonies. The 
Conservatives sought protectionism to guard Canada’s infant industries from its more 
developed southern neighbor and to retaliate against Anglophobic Republican desires to 
build a high tariff wall along the Canadian-American border.
Some Republican imperialists were also beginning to cast an expansive eye toward the 
Pacific in the 1870s. In 1875, the Republican administration of Ulysses S. Grant signed a 
reciprocity treaty with Hawaii, foreshadowing a revolutionary shift that would occur 
under the 1890 McKinley Tariff. Republican-style reciprocity would become an 
established program for informal imperial expansion into foreign markets. Providing a 
hint of the Republican informal imperial program that would be enshrined in the 1890 
McKinley Tariff, the 1875 treaty forbade Hawaii, or the Sandwich Islands, from signing 
reciprocity treaties with other countries that promised the same concessions as those 
given to the United States.
Where reciprocity had previously been associated with trade liberalization through the 
inclusion of a most-favored-nation clause (most famously in the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier 
Treaty between Britain and France), this nascent Republican protectionist version of 
reciprocity coercively limited the foreign trade policy of the Sandwich Islands and, in so 
doing, limited U.S. and Hawaiian opportunities to develop freer trade with other nations. 
The Republican administration of Rutherford Hayes, in turn, signed a treaty with Samoa 
in 1878, granting U.S. access to Pago Pago and thereby providing the United States with 
a coaling station for U.S. ships destined for the fabled China market.
Mexico was also increasingly entering into Republican imperial designs. In 1883, the 
Republican administration of Chester Arthur requested that former President Grant 
should seek a restrictive reciprocity treaty with America’s southern neighbor. European 
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powers still had economic interests in Mexico. Arthur was hoping to limit European 
influence and spur the struggling trade of the “New South.” However, Louisiana sugar 
growers were opposed, and the bill ended up lumped in with other proposed reciprocity 
treaties with Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, along with a proposal for 
the creation of a Nicaraguan canal.
Grover Cleveland’s Democratic administration from 1885 to 1889 was the first non-
Republican presidency in a quarter-century. Cleveland surrounded himself with American 
Cobdenite free traders, including his secretaries of State, War, Interior, Agriculture, and 
Treasury, and economic advisors Edward Atkinson and David Ames Wells, the two 
principal leaders of the postbellum U.S. free trade movement and prominent U.S. 
members of the London-based Cobden Club, which had been founded in 1866 in order to 
spread Richard Cobden’s Victorian free-trade ideology abroad, especially to the United 
States. Cleveland and his Cobdenite cabinet attempted to turn the United States from the 
American System to one of free trade. As a result, Cleveland forced the 1888 presidential 
elections into a referendum on American foreign trade policy.
The influence of American Cobdenite free traders within Cleveland’s cabinet held out the 
possibility of a shift toward trade liberalization and foreign policy noninterventionism as 
an alternative to Republican protectionism and imperialism. Upon taking office, the 
Cleveland administration extricated the country from proposed Republican imperial plans 
to annex territory in Nicaragua for the construction of an isthmian canal and from 
coercively expanding U.S. economic influence in the Congo and Samoa. The Cobdenite 
Cleveland administration also sought to take an ameliorative approach toward U.S.-
Canadian economic relations. Democratic tariff bills for freer trade, in turn, were 
proposed unsuccessfully in 1886 and 1888. In December 1887, Cleveland provocatively 
called for freer trade in his annual message, forcing the coming year’s elections—the 
1888 “Great Debate” over low or high tariffs—into a referendum on U.S. foreign trade 
policy.
Once again, Anglo-American relations contributed to debates over U.S. trade policy. 
Conspiratorial charges that Cleveland and his cabinet were in league with free-trade 
England followed the administration’s policies of noninterventionism and freer trade. 
Anglophobic insinuations of a British free trade conspiracy became a ubiquitous part of 
the Republican Party’s campaign strategy to defeat Cleveland. Such attacks helped 
Benjamin Harrison defeat Cleveland and helped give the Republicans a majority in both 
houses of Congress. It appeared to Harrison and his incoming protectionist cabinet that 
the American people had spoken regarding U.S. foreign trade policy. An innovative 
imperial program of protectionism and Republican-style restrictive reciprocity were high 
on the new administration’s legislative agenda.
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Republican Reciprocity and U.S. Imperialism, 
1890–1898
Following the release of the 1890 Census, the historian Frederick Jackson Turner 
pessimistically pondered what the end of the American continental frontier might mean 
for U.S. democracy and expansion. In an era frequented by economic panics and by fears 
of British free trade imperialism in Latin America, the Pacific, and the United States 
itself, more and more Americans were desirous of accessing foreign markets. With the 
end of Turner’s “frontier,” political and ideological debates over U.S. foreign trade policy 
were also becoming increasingly tied to debates over American imperialism.
Republican control of both congressional houses allowed passage of the McKinley Tariff 
in October 1890. The bill’s extreme levels of protectionism—including an ad valorem rate 
of approximately 50 percent—sent economic shockwaves to the far reaches of the earth, 
highlighting the global impact of U.S. trade policy by the late 19th century. For example, 
nationalist calls for protectionism in India increased, thousands were put out of work in 
Germany, Britain, and Austria, and it was reported that one wool mill owner in 
Lichtenberg was even driven to suicide as a result of the U.S. legislation, and demands 
for imperial federation and tariff retaliation arose throughout the British World of white 
settler colonies.
The imperial-minded administration of Benjamin Harrison also innovatively began 
implementing what would become a key protectionist weapon in the Republican Party’s 
informal imperial arsenal—reciprocity. The reciprocity provision in the new protectionist 
legislation included a conditional most-favored-nation clause, in contrast to the inclusivity 
of an unconditional most-favored-nation clause that free traders supported. Not only 
could the reciprocity treaty lower tariff rates with signatories; the U.S. president could 
decide to retaliate with massive punitive tariffs against signatories if they were deemed 
to have deviated from the terms of the agreement. The goal was to induce Latin American 
states to sign exclusive reciprocal agreements with the United States, and thereby 
undercut the economic influence of the European powers in the hemisphere. Signatories 
included El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, 
and Spanish-controlled Puerto Rico and Cuba.
The McKinley Tariff’s passage also placed added strain on Canadian-American trade 
relations, especially when coupled with lingering controversies surrounding U.S. access 
to Canadian waters. The McKinley Tariff effectively excluded Canada from reciprocal 
trade relations. As a result, the new U.S. protective tariff forced the Canadian federal 
elections of 1891 into a referendum on North American economic integration. The Liberal 
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Party ran on a Canadian-American trade liberalization plank, and the Conservative 
platform supported shifting Canadian trade from the United States to the British Empire. 
The Conservatives won, setting the tone for restrained North American trade for about a 
century. In 1897, Canada developed an imperial trade preference program and a 
protectionist program for its southern neighbor.
The McKinley Tariff also placed raw sugar on the list of free imports, which destabilized 
the international trade in sugar. It offset the move at home by providing U.S. sugar 
growers with a sizable bounty. The bounty was seen as a threat to protective beet sugar 
industries in Europe. Even more, the tariff undermined the cane sugar interests in 
Hawaii, which had been receiving special access to the U.S. market under the previous 
1876 reciprocity treaty. The changes wrought by the McKinley Tariff sparked a severe 
depression in Hawaii. Sugar made up over 90 percent of the country’s exports, and these 
exports were now in global competition with all the other sugar exporters for the U.S. 
market. Hawaiian sugar growers—predominantly U.S. businessmen—decided that U.S. 
annexation of Hawaii would fix the crisis. The Harrison administration aided the endeavor 
by sending U.S. naval support to back up the annexationists. The Hawaiian queen was 
immediately deposed. The Harrison administration then sought quick ratification of the 
proposed treaty of annexation, but they could not get it through Congress before Grover 
Cleveland reentered the White House in early 1893. In nearly his first act, Cleveland 
vetoed the Hawaiian annexation treaty and restored the Hawaiian monarchy. The 
Democrats swept back into power. Controlling both houses of Congress, they were able 
to pass the more moderate Wilson-Gorman bill in 1894. Notably, the new tariff also undid 
the Republican Party’s reciprocity program established under the McKinley Tariff.
The Open Door Notes and America’s Closed-
Door Empire, 1897–1913
Ohio Republican William McKinley—the “Napoleon of Protection”—won the presidency 
running (as he had in the House) on the slogan “protection and reciprocity.” Practically 
his first act when he entered office in 1897 was to see the Wilson-Gorman Tariff replaced 
with the highly protectionist Dingley Tariff. The new tariff legislation again included a 
retaliatory reciprocity clause—what McKinley’s Secretary of Treasury Leslie Shaw 
described as “the natural handmaiden of protection”—setting the imperial stage for a 
Republican-dominated expansionist foreign trade policy of protectionism mixed with 
reciprocity for years to come.
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Republican Secretary of State John Hay’s “Open Door Notes” of 1899 and 1900, calling 
for equal access to Chinese markets, have long been misconstrued as a call for free trade. 
But the notes fell far short of free trade; instead, they demanded equal treatment and 
access to the fabled China market. Indeed, the McKinley administration described the ill-
named open door policy as part and parcel of its expansive vision for protectionist 
imperialism. As Massachusetts Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge argued in a 
speech before Boston’s protectionist Home Market Club in 1901, the open door “does not 
mean free trade. Let China levy any duties she pleases, but let them be the same to all 
the world.” A protectionist journal, the American Economist, similarly observed that same 
year that “the magnificent open door policy is Protection for American industry.” It is also 
illuminating that the call for equal tariff treatment was directed only at China, where the 
United States held little influence, and not at America’s colonies acquired from the 1898 
Spanish-American War.
The ad hoc nature of what is better described as a closed-door empire followed U.S. trade 
policy toward Puerto Rico in 1900. Republican protectionists fast realized that if they 
opened U.S. doors to Puerto Rican trade, they would next have to open them to Cuban 
sugar and tobacco growers and to cheap Filipino labor. A McKinley administration 
spokesman rather aptly described the dilemma in April 1900: the President did not “want 
any legislation for Puerto Rico that will keep us from legislating for Manila.” It was then 
decided that the United States would extend a slight discount on Puerto Rican imports, 
but still would levy protective duties. The Supreme Court gave its legal seal of approval in 
the first of many so-called Insular Cases. The May 1901 decision effectively gave legal 
sanction to the U.S. imperialism of economic nationalism. The court decreed that the U.S. 
government had the right to enact protectionist legislation on Puerto Rican imports. The 
court’s decision led the British writer Sidney Brooks to declare, “The American Empire is 
a Protectionist Empire.” Other critics noted that it meant that the U.S. colonies would 
remain outside the powers guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution.
President McKinley’s ad hoc imperialism of economic nationalism was then promptly 
enacted in the recently acquired colonies. For example, from 1898 to 1902, the U.S. 
government treated the Philippines as a foreign state, fearing an influx of Asian exports 
and immigrants if the colony were given free access to the U.S. market. The 1902 U.S. 
Revenue Act thereafter gave Filipino exports a 25 percent discount when entering the 
United States. The subsequent “splits” tax—a 100 percent tax on non-U.S. textiles—was 
supposed to spark Filipino purchases of U.S. cotton textiles, but the increased prices 
were too high for the poverty-stricken people. The results of the “splits” tax earned the 
ire of the Episcopalian bishop of the Philippines, Charles H. Bent, in 1906. His criticisms 
were seconded by the American Anti-Imperial League. The 1909 Philippine Tariff Act and 
the Payne-Aldrich Tariff had the dual effect of eliminating tariffs between the United 
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States and the Philippines, but also included duties on any non-U.S. imports to the Pacific 
colony.
The Puerto Rican trade policy developments also played a crucial part in the debate over 
Cuban reciprocity. Unlike the Philippines and Puerto Rico, Cuba was not technically a 
formal U.S. colony, but it had become one in all but name following the 1901 Platt 
Amendment. Owing to the influence of the Sugar Trust, which hoped to gain free access 
to Cuban raw sugar, a reciprocity treaty was crafted from 1902 to 1903 that gave 
preferential treatment to Cuban exports to the United States. U.S. beet sugar growers 
were less than happy with the prospect of competing with Cuban sugar, so the 1903 
treaty ended up also including some measure of protectionism on Cuban exports to the 
United States, much like the discounted tariff rate that was established for Puerto Rico. 
This policy was replaced by a harsher retaliatory tariff by the Taft administration in 1909 
that closed the door even more to free Cuban access to the U.S. market. As these 
Republican-led trade policies in its colonies illuminate, by the time of World War I, U.S. 
foreign trade policy had thus transformed into an expansive imperial program of 
protectionism and restrictive, exclusive reciprocity.
The GOP’s imperialistic economic nationalism found its turn-of-the-century complement 
in “dollar diplomacy,” the extension of much-needed loans to Caribbean and Pacific states 
like Nicaragua and the Philippines in exchange for control over the country’s monetary 
and trade policies. U.S. financial missionaries like Charles Conant were empowered with 
overhauling the tariff policy and monetary policies of these predominantly silver-using 
countries by placing them on a gold-exchange system based upon the U.S. dollar—and 
backed with the threat of U.S. Marines. Democratic President Woodrow Wilson expanded 
this imperial program into Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic during World 
War I.
The expansion of U.S. imperial foreign trade policy in the Western Hemisphere 
exacerbated tensions with the European powers. For example, Germany responded to the 
protectionist 1897 Dingley Tariff—which discouraged German manufacturing exports to 
the United States—by decreasing its importation of U.S. foodstuffs. The 1909 Payne-
Aldrich Tariff’s maximum-minimum schedule deviated somewhat from previous 
Republican tariffs by including a general minimum tariff that could be replaced by a 
maximum tariff schedule against states that discriminated against U.S. exports. This 
threat of retaliatory maximum duties allowed President Taft to negotiate treaties with 
twenty-three nations. The new tariff also left the option on the table for conditional most-
favored-nation reciprocity treaties, such as that unsuccessfully proffered to Canada in 
1911. So, too, did continued British supremacy in South American trade, alongside the 
substantial growth of German export markets in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, serve to 
strengthen the Republicans’ predilection for protectionism as both an offensive and 
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defensive weapon, and to exacerbate transatlantic trade tensions in the years leading up 
to World War I.
Discussion of the Literature
Alfred Eckes (1995) provides a sweeping history of the opening of the U.S. market and the 
debates surrounding it across the 19th and 20th centuries. Max Edling’s (2003) work on 
U.S. economic development during the Revolutionary and Early Republican periods has 
ably connected U.S. fiscal-military policy to the country’s constitutional and trade history. 
Paul Gilje (2013) in turn has recently reexamined how U.S. foreign trade policy across this 
early period, particularly debates over free trade, played a key role in the outbreak of 
another war with the British in 1812. Others, like Brian Schoen (2009), have uncovered the 
sophisticated, albeit ultimately flawed, foreign market vision of the antebellum South. 
The importance of transatlantic trade developments on U.S. westward expansion was 
uncovered back in the 1920s and 1930s by Thomas Martin (1928, 1932) and Fred Merk 
(1934), a subject that has since been revisited by Scott James, David A. Lake (1989), and 
Marc-William Palen (2016).
The history of U.S. foreign trade policy by the Civil War era in many ways merges with 
longstanding historiographical debates over U.S. imperial expansion. Orthodox histories 
deemphasized foreign trade’s importance within the history of U.S. foreign relations 
because U.S. foreign trade made up such a small percentage of the country’s GDP. But in 
the 1930s, Charles Beard (1934) began to push back, arguing that the political and 
ideological debates surrounding U.S. foreign trade policy were closely tied to the history 
of what he called U.S. “open door” expansionism.  With the publication of The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy in 1959, William Appleman Williams (University of Wisconsin, 
Madison) provocatively brought Beard’s speculations together with a Marxist critique of 
U.S. capitalist development. Williams and subsequent scholars of the so-called Wisconsin 
School, such as Walter LaFeber (1963), provocatively suggested that the actual amount of 
U.S. foreign trade mattered little; it was the perception of the need for new markets that 
made U.S. foreign trade policy so important. The works of Wisconsin School historians Ed 
Crapol (1973), Tom Terrill (1973), and Thomas McCormick (1967) have delved more deeply 
into the domestic and congressional politics over foreign trade, as has the earlier work of 
Edward Stanwood (1903) and Frank Taussig (1924, 1931). Innovative studies of U.S. 
economic globalization, such as those of Kristin Hoganson (2007) and Emily Rosenberg 
(1982, 2003), in turn have begun to draw much-needed attention to the important role that 
American consumer culture, financial missionaries, and multinational corporations have 
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played in the development of U.S. foreign trade policy in the late 19th and early 20th 
century.
The influence of Gallagher and Robinson’s “imperialism of free trade” thesis also played a 
critical role in the shaping of the Wisconsin School’s revisionist scholarship, as it allowed 
them to uncover an informal U.S. empire—an Open Door Empire–built around U.S. 
foreign trade policy.  Williams (1959, 1969) described Open Door imperialism as the 
American version of the imperialism of free trade. For the Wisconsin School, debates over 
the course of U.S. foreign trade policy were portrayed as tactical debates of informal U.S. 
imperial expansion—assertions that the nature of U.S. capitalism tragically and inevitably 
led to U.S. imperialism since its founding. Americans at all levels—government, business, 
agrarian, labor, Republicans, and Democrats—were thus portrayed as advocates of 
American free trade or open-door imperial expansion that is commonly associated with 
U.S. “neoliberal” trade expansion after World War II, culminating in the rise of the 
“Washington Consensus” within U.S. foreign trade policy in the late 1980s.
The Wisconsin School’s revisionist open-door imperial scholarship has not gone 
unchallenged. William Becker (1982) has uncovered how the intensity of industrial 
demands for U.S. export promotion into foreign markets at the turn of the century was 
far from even or universal. And in the 1990s and early 2000s, scholars like David Pletcher 
(1998, 2001) and Alfred Eckes (1995) placed renewed attention upon the 19th-century 
debates over foreign trade policy and the opening of America’s market. They also 
emphasized the ad hoc shifts in U.S. foreign market expansion, rather than the Wisconsin 
School’s portrayal of bipartisan imperial continuity. More recently, the Wisconsin 
School’s free trade characterization of U.S. foreign trade policy has come under scrutiny 
for the long 19th century. Historians now note that U.S. foreign trade policy during the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, in particular—where so much revisionist open-door 
scholarship has focused—was a period when economic nationalist trade policies 
dominated. Historians such as Marc-William Palen suggest instead that this was not an 
open-door empire, but an expansive closed-door empire; through a combination of 
protectionism and restrictive reciprocity, the United States practiced the imperialism of 
economic nationalism, not the imperialism of free trade. In other words, the United 
States was enforcing preferential protectionist measures on its formal and informal 
empire, not free trade. This post-revisionist scholarship accordingly draws renewed 
attention to the great debate over U.S. foreign trade policy, to the economic ideas that 
underpinned it, and to its consequences for U.S. imperial expansion to 1914.
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Primary Sources
The papers of many of the key shapers of U.S. foreign trade policy throughout the long 
19th century are now available in print, on microfilm, and in American archives. See, 
especially, the archival holdings of the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, and the New York Public Library. The debate over U.S. 
foreign trade policy filled the free trade and protectionist organizational propaganda, be 
it pamphlets, speeches, conference proceedings, cartoons, and leaflets. The pro-
Democratic Punch and the pro-Republican Judge magazines are quite useful. For the 
changing meaning of reciprocity, alongside the above resources, the work of J. Laurence 
Laughlin, H. Parker Willis, and Frank Taussig’s work remain quite instructive despite 
their age.  Informative U.S. government publications include the U.S. State Department’s
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, as well as the Annals of Congress
(1789–1824), the Register of Debates in Congress (1824–1837), Congressional Globe
(1833–-1873), the Congressional Record, the annual reports of U.S. consuls on U.S. 
commercial relations, and U.S. tariff commission reports. Many of these also include 
useful statistics relating to U.S. foreign trade.
Digital media databases are available through Nineteenth Century US Newspapers 
Online, Google News Archive, Google Books, and the digital archives of the New York 
Times and the Washington Post. The Library of Congress continues to digitize a large 
amount of uncopyrighted material from the era, including the Congressional Record
and its predecessors, and some wonderful cartoon collections from popular U.S. 
political magazines. Foreign online databases are also helpful in exploring the history of 
U.S. foreign trade policy. Hansard online provides easy access to British parliamentary 
debates, for example, and the British Library’s online collection of 19th-century 
newspapers is an excellent resource, as are those of the Economist (by subscription)
and the London Times (by subscription). Australia’s newspaper collections are 
accessible via Trove. JSTOR (by subscription) includes a growing number of the era’s 
U.S. and British pamphlets and journals, such as its “19th Century British Pamphlets” 
collection.
Foreign archives also house many collections not yet available online. The National 
Library and Archives, Canada, in Ottawa, contains many Canadian newspapers archives, 
as well as government documents. The National Archives at Kew also contain government 
documents related to U.S. foreign trade policy.
Primary sources relating to postbellum U.S. foreign trade policy are plentiful. For 
example, the New York Public Library holds the records of the American Free Trade 
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League, the most active U.S. free trade organization in the postbellum period, and the 
papers of many of its leaders. The manuscripts of London’s Cobden Club can be found at 
the Public Records Office in Chichester. The club’s manuscripts, along with their 
propaganda material, which can be found in archives across the globe, provide a useful 
perspective into how free traders in Europe and across the British World perceived U.S. 
foreign trade policy. The publications of British protectionist leagues such as the Fair 
Trade League, the United Empire Trade League, and the Tariff Reform League illustrate 
how U.S. foreign trade policy influenced British imperial trade policy, in England and 
across the British World of white settler colonies.
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